what do fuck are you doing aq

i start sex and she call me. after sex i smokine and washe my hands. we are the children of bodoom but i dont have a chance. i ask from where killing is coming and he says the communicability of our everyday understanding of the object, and not merely of the more specialist understanding provided by critics and experts. Now Kant also describes the aesthetic feeling of pleasure or displeasure, i.e. our awareness of the common sense, as a feeling of life: "Here the representation is referred wholly to the Subject, and what is more to its feeling of lifeunder the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure ... "38 If this identification is to help explain the judgement of taste, then this notion of the feeling of life should not refer to some vague and speculative principle of personal identity. Instead it should involve certain concrete, though fundamental, feelings that may serve as an evaluative criterion of our experiences and emotions, in much the following way: whenever the feeling of life (feeling of "Lust und Unlust") is enhanced, be it positively or negatively, there are possibilities at stake: alternatives to the actual situation. The positive enhancement of the feeling of life would then imply that there is something to be celebrated (and to be continued), and taken that the enhancement relates to possibilities, this celebration will regard the acknowledgement that the situation as experienced is not nearly as necessary as it might have seemed, but is nevertheless of such a nature that one would want it to continue. In other words, our aesthetic judgements express not only our awareness of the communicability of our cognitive considerations, but also the fact that there is no metaphysical necessity to it. We must understand aesthetic pleasure, then, as a reflective assessment by our feeling of life, of the contingency of the common sense that is involved in our (everyday) determinations of the object. vi. An ideal aesthetic experience We think something is wrong with the elitist person judging aesthetic matters from a purely social point of view, citing other people's appraisals without 'looking for himself.' Yet Nelson Goodman may be right in presupposing that in an aesthetic argument we are more interested in information about the object than in some rather uninformative idiosyncratic evaluation. To state an everyday corollary to this: we do let ourselves be convinced by arguments and descriptions of the object; we do communicate about aesthetic values as if they were natural properties; and we hardly ever have aesthetic experiences corresponding to the Kantian analysis, let alone do we actually ever refer to them. Therefore, it is no coincidence that a theoretical definition of empirical aesthetic experiences is not available. Monroe Beardsley, for example, has found only a set of necessary conditions, and has argued that we are unable to state the conditions that are also sufficient for such a definition. So we may in the end be tempted to dismiss the involved claims and the notion of aesthetic experience altogether, as Goodman does. However, one may as well conclude from this situation that in arguing about matters of taste, recourse is taken not to any actual experience, but rather to an ideal one. Goodman's denial of aesthetic experience also does not follow from his remarks on what he calls the symptoms of art (avoiding the implication of the definability of 'art'): the complex syntactic and semantic properties of their symbol systems. Instead, this specific complexity may be we are start to sex. i hope just beat it but he dont touch me. i cry for you.