teacher

i like girls. and teache is a girl. or teacher is a man. she teaches me sex. i like sex and i hope better. imagine on the people and what are we talking here about them. call of duty ktulu sex machine. we are often aware of the contingency of our own judgements\\\\\\\\ways, as natural properties, or as reducible to such properties, descriptions of which will then be true or false.1 However, I think that contrary to such an evasive account we would do better in elaborating the subjectivism that David Wiggins has defended, which does not deny the role played by objective properties, but which neither neglects the subjective import. He claims that aesthetic values are somehow a kind of <property - response> relation, which is settled by an elaborate process of criticism and refinement of perceptions, and of the relevance of our feelings regarding specific natural properties.2 Clearly this account does not automatically explain any concrete application of an evaluative term to a particular event or thing although it may provide us with the means to do so: initially it is merely procedural. The argument in this paper suggests that the analysis of a paradagmatic <property, response> pair, \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'aesthetic excellence\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\', provides us with interesting insights in the idea that our judgements of taste are founded upon an aesthetic experience.3 Now, regarding aesthetic experience we find that, apart from Wiggins\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\' nominal account, only two rather unfortunate strategies appear to have been available to analytic philosophers. Either the notion of aesthetic experience is being dismissed because of its alleged non-specificity in comparison with more normal cognitive experiences, or an identification of its actual instances is being attempted.4 The first strategy sacrifices a core item of our aesthetic discourse, whereas the second inevitably forces us to acknowledge, first, that an identification of empirical, contingent aesthetic experiences will not help advancing a theoretical, general account of aesthetic evaluation, and secondly, that no satisfactory identification of empirical aesthetic experiences will even be possible, as none of its conditions will be necessary and sufficient at the same time.

Obviously, the notion is hard to apprehend. Now what I think is wrong with these two strategies is that they do not distinguish between our actual experiences and the use to which we put them in grounding our judgements in them. In what follows I shall not explicitly criticize these two strategies but propose instead an interpretation of Kant\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s aesthetic theory that sustains a third strategy that does not suffer from their disadvantages.5 It will be up to subsequent investigation to establish if and how this third strategy fits in with the more general, currently made distinction between contents and justificatory grounds of aesthetic judgements, or with Wiggins\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Now if we can make these two points come together and find the resultant theory a plausible one, we may have found a way out of the dilemma put before us by the two unfortunate strategies. This is what I shall do: first, I shall present an interpretation of Kant\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'s Critique of Judgement showing that Kant legitimizes aesthetic discourse with the specific awareness of the communicability of our determinations of the object, which shows forth from our feeling of subjective finality; with an awareness, i.e., and not merely with the communicability that is its subject matter. Discourse on aesthetic excellence is ultimately founded upon our pleasant, reflective acknowledgement of a common sense: description of natural properties is insufficient fuel for evaluation if it remains without a certain experiential supplement of some Aha-Erlebnis where the penny drops and the response in question is taken to be the right one. I tend to ascribe more depth, and more relevance for our lives\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\' integrity to aesthetic experience than that. In what follows we shall see where this substantiality ends up. Secondly then, I argue that Kant can only account for the decisive role of aesthetic experiences within aesthetic discourse if he takes them on the one hand not as actual empirical experiences but as ideal ones, and on the other, as functioning regulatively for the aesthetic application of the faculty of judgement. Part I. Why we can argue in matters of taste i. Common sense According to Kant, the most crucial problem for aesthetics is the antinomy of taste: we argue a lot about aesthetic matters, and rightly so, but at the same time we are convinced that no

being a typical instance of common sense and on the other as entailing recognition of our presupposing its existence, thus leaving open the question of how exactly common sense relates to the judgement of taste. ii. that we cannot describe, but what kind of rule can this be?15 For example, in an herbarium examples of plants are depicted in such a way as to enable us to identify actual plants in nature. Some conventional system is at work here: we must understand the ways in which plants differ in general from their representations to remark their resemblances. We must reconcile differences in dimensionality, dimension, colour, mobility, et cetera. On top of this conventional system we must be aware of the various ways in which representations of distinct plants differ from one another. There are, indeed, rules involved in such herbal identifications, and each time we succeed in identifying a plant we will be able to provide a satisfactory description of the involved rule. Now, it cannot be this way with a concrete beautiful thing being an exemplary case. Clearly we do not have herbarium-like books which have arranged all exemplary.

cases of beautiful things into some hierarchy. Of course we do have books representing the paintings of subsequent ages, periods, styles, and painters, but, firstly, these are not books assembling all and only undescribable rule needs elaboration. An important part of the interpretation of this metaphor is that in claiming universal validity we acknowledge that the free play engages more normal cognitive considerations.17 This might account for the appearance that some rule is involved in aesthetic matters. Our awareness of the s natural properties, so our uncertainty about our evaluative judgement cannot be reduced to this acknowledgement of our merely cognitive shortcomings. Instead, this uncertainty relates to a different theoretical point. I will go into this later, in section vi, which deals with the regulative and ideal nature of aesthetic experience. iii. Beautyand she dont like me. i ask why?