lets speak english

i am from norway and i like sex. because i dont give my ass to anybody. but people want my ass and fuck. when i said i am a turk, people run to mountain. i like winds. burn from the dark i said everbody. everbody loves why not me. however problematically so. The pleasant awareness of common sense that forms the principle of aesthetic discourse therefore cannot be constitutive, which we could also have derived from the fact that we cannot prove a thing's beauty on the ground of this awareness. So the principle of aesthetic discourse must indeed be regulative: it rests upon the identity of aesthetic experience. In short, for aesthetic discourse aesthetic experience itself functions as the regulative principle. Again, the empirically indistinct character of aesthetic experience can, in combination with its regulative functionality, be accounted for by taking it as functioning within aesthetic discourse as an 'asymptotic' ideality, rather than as an identifiable and substantial empirical event. There are two important aspects to this ideality. On the one hand the aesthetic experience may be an actuality for some of us at some specific time, but even then no determinate claims as to this actuality will provide a knock-down argument, nor will they deepen the relevant issue. We will not be convinced of a thing's beauty by a statement such as: "Believe you me, I had this aesthetic experience when contemplating this object, so it must be beautiful." Moreover, no empirical identification of the aesthetic experience is ever going to be operable, as the symptoms of aesthetic experience reveal an obvious vagueness.42 All this is not accidental, but rather proves its merely regulative nature. As such the aesthetic experience is an ideality, and may just as well, without loss of regulative functionality, be a figment of the imagination. On the other hand this aesthetic experience is an idealization in that we ascribe comprehensiveness, and coherence to it, and take it to include many important realizations, such as our feeling of being at home in the world, in life, and amongst other people. In sum, the strategy yielded by this article to account for aesthetic experience's decisive role in discourse on aesthetic excellence is twofold: first, we must understand such discourse as antinomic, in that for cognitive considerations to be significant they ought to be supplemented by an experiential reflection of these. However, secondly, this aesthetic experience is merely a regulative ideal. If we want to get rid of the notion altogether we need other arguments than the ones stating its empirical nonidentifyability. NOTES 1 Of those who are engaged in this problematic Nicholas Wolterstorff pushes forward our merely idiosyncratic reasons for liking an object as decisive ('An Engagement With Kant's Theory of Beauty', in: Ralf Meerbote (ed.): Kant's Aesthetics, Atascadero, Cal., 1991, p. 105 ff). Anthony Savile (in his brilliant Kantian Aesthetics Pursued, Edinburgh, 1993) and Mary Mothersill in her article on 'The Antinomy of Taste' (in Meerbote, 1991, p. 75 ff.), both direct our attention to the possibility of assessment of the truth value of the judgement with regard to its content. 2 Wiggins, D.: Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, essay V: 'A Sensible Subjectivism?' 3 I do not think that the distinction between beauty and the sublime is intelligible, but will not argue against it in this paper. Instead I will treat them as on a par, and talk instead of 'aesthetic excellence', which everybody will agree comprises both. 4 An important example of the former strategy can be found in Nelson Goodman's writings whereas Monroe Beardsley and George Dickie clearly follow the latter. 5 The controversial character of some of Kant's presuppositions, such as his division between transcendental idealism and empirical realism, may prove to be rather crucial for his aesthetic theory, but I will not go into these matters here. 6 In keeping with Meredith's translation I use the term 'sound understanding' for our everyday common sense, and 'common sense' for the idea of universal rationality described in Kant's analysis, for 'Gemeinsinn', i.e. See also section v below. References to Kant's Critique of Judgement are, respectively, to the Meredith translation (1928), the B-edition (1793), and the Suhrkamp edition (1974). The demand of an experiential supplement ought to be distinguished from the Kantian position concerning knowledge being a function of the forms of intuition and of the categories in that with regard to knowledge the experiential demand is general and does not have to be met in every given case: with regard to knowledge one can justified in believing certain claims on the mere grounds of testimony. This possibility is excluded from the aesthetiomain. 7 In par. 17 of the Critique of Judgement, and again in par. 34. 8 "Therefore [judgements of taste] must have a subjective principle, and one which determines what pleases or displeases, by means of feeling only and not through concepts, but yet with universal validity. Such a principle, however, could only be regarded as a common sense." (CJ, M82 (KU, B 65, 157)). 9 CJ, M84 (K the note in the 'Remark' of the deduction of judgements of taste (par. 38, CJ, M147 (KU, B151, 221). 11 CJ, M85e taken to mean some external sense, but the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition)." (CJ, M83 (KU, B64-65, 157). 13 "It may be a matter of uncertainty whether a person who thinks he is laying down a judgement of taste is, in fact, judging in conformity with that idea; but that this idea is what is contemplated [darauf beziehe] in his judgement, and that, consequently, it is meant to be a judgement of taste, is proclaimed by his use of the expression 'beauty'. For himself he can be certain on the point from his mere consciousness of the separation of everything belonging to the agreeable and the good from the delight remaining to him; and this is all for which he promises himself the agreement of every one a claim which, under these conditions, he would also be warranted in making, were all friends i said. i like sex all time.